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A B S T R A C T
Cyber-physical systems tightly integrate physical processes and information and commu-
nication technologies. As today’s critical infrastructures, e.g., the power grid or water
distribution networks, are complex cyber-physical systems, ensuring their safety and se-
curity becomes of paramount importance.Traditional safety analysis methods, such as HAZOP,
are ill-suited to assess these systems. Furthermore, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are often
not considered critical, because their effects on the physical processes are not fully under-
stood. In this work, we present STPA-SafeSec, a novel analysis methodology for both safety
and security. Its results show the dependencies between cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
system safety. Using this information, the most effective mitigation strategies to ensure safety
and security of the system can be readily identified. We apply STPA-SafeSec to a use case
in the power grid domain, and highlight its benefits.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Critical infrastructures, e.g., the power grid or water distribu-
tion network, are cyber-physical systems (CPS): physical
processes and components are connected over information and
communication technologies (ICT), which are critical for correct
system operation. As computing power and network trans-
mission speeds increase, new applications for industrial control
systems (ICS) build on advances in ICT to improve the effi-
ciency of the underlying physical systems. These new
applications create a tighter integration between physical pro-
cesses and the cyber domain. Furthermore, systems are
becoming more interconnected and thus more complex.
It is important to analyze the implications this increased
use of ICT and resultant complexity has on the safety of these
cyber-physical systems. This is necessary to ensure that safety
requirements are identified and addressed as part of the system
design process. Alongside safety aspects, cybersecurity threats
to cyber-physical systems are becoming a concern.The Stuxnet
virus (Karnouskos, 2011) or an attack on a German steel mill
(Lee et al., 2014) showed how successful cyber-attacks can cause
physical damage. Additionally, in the energy domain, re-
search by Kang et al. (2015) has demonstrated how a multistage
cyber-attack could result in the manipulation of a photovol-
taic inverter, changing its active power output.
Traditional analysis methods that aim to assess the safety
of critical infrastructures fail to encompass the complexity of
emerging cyber-physical systems (Leveson, 2011). They work
with accident models that are based on the fault-error-failure
chain (see Avizienis et al., 2004). While these models are valid
to describe failures of linear systems and single components,
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they are insufficient to describe system failures in complex in-
terconnected systems.To tackle this shortcoming, Leveson (2004)
has developed the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Pro-
cesses (STAMP) accident model. Based on STAMP, the System
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) approach was developed as
a new hazard analysis technique to evaluate the safety of a
system.
Current approaches to examining cybersecurity for cyber-
physical systems are often based on an analysis of ICT protocols
or network configurations, and are therefore strongly biased
by information security concerns (Young and Leveson, 2014).
Additionally, the effects of cyber-attacks need to be analyzed
from a safety perspective. In this way, the potential impact of
cyber-attacks on the safety of physical processes can be iden-
tified. To accurately quantify these impacts, an understanding
of the relationship between cyber-attacks and physical pro-
cesses is needed, requiring dedicated safety and security
analysis techniques. In order to address this issue, Young and
Leveson (2013, 2014) have developed STPA-sec, which uses the
fundamental principles of STPA in the security domain.
However, we will show in Sect. 3.1 that their approach — which
indicates a separate analysis method for safety (STPA) and se-
curity (STPA-sec) — needs to be improved and clarified.
In this work, we present a novel analysis methodology that
integrates safety analysis (STPA) and security analysis (STPA-
sec) into one concise framework: STPA-SafeSec. Further, we
overcome limitations of STPA by introducing security con-
straints to the analysis and by mapping the abstract control
level of the system that is analyzed by STPA to real compo-
nents. STPA-SafeSec provides a number of benefits over existing
work: (i) it provides a single approach to identify safety and
security constraints that then need to be ensured by the system
in order to operate loss free. This single approach allows the
interdependencies between safety and security constraints to
be detected and used in mitigation strategies; (ii) the most criti-
cal system components can be prioritized for in-depth security
analysis (e.g. penetration testing); (iii) the results from the analy-
sis show the potential system losses that can be caused by a
specific security or safety vulnerability in the system; and (iv)
mitigation strategies can be more readily designed and their
effectiveness evaluated — changes in the physical process can
be used to mitigate cyber-attacks, while control algorithms can
mitigate safety limitations of the physical processes or devices.
The rest of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2
we summarize previous work and highlight the shortcom-
ings that our work overcomes. Section 3 motivates our approach
before we present STPA-SafeSec in detail. To evaluate STPA-
SafeSec we apply it to a use case in the power grid domain.
This use case is described in Section 4, the results of the analy-
sis in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion of the
results before Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
Two groups of hazard analysis techniques can be identified:
Failure-based hazard analysis techniques and systems-based
hazard analysis techniques. Examples for failure-based tech-
niques are Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Watson, 1961) and Failure
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Duckworth and Moore, 2010;
Standard, 1980). Failure-based methods focus on the identifi-
cation of the effects and probabilities of single component
failures. The probabilities of component failures allow failure-
based techniques to be quantifiable. However, the effectiveness
of failure-based techniques and the increasing complexity of
modern systems led to a new type of accidents rooted in the
interaction of components. In order to understand this new
type of accidents, system-based analysis techniques are needed.
One such technique is the Hazard and Operability Analysis
(HAZOP) (Lawley, 1974). Based on a firm system design, rel-
evant system parameters are defined and guidewords are then
used to identify how the system could deviate from the de-
signed behavior. Over the years, researchers tried to formalize
HAZOP to achieve objective and quantifiable results. But as
Dunjó et al. (2010) highlight, all approaches to quantify the
results led back to the use of failure-based FTA. System-
based approaches are difficult to quantify because modern
systems rely increasingly on software systems to control physi-
cal processes and are further embedded in socio-technical
environments. Both software bugs as well as the effects of non-
technical influences on the system over time are very hard to
measure at design time. STPA aims to address these new chal-
lenges in a new system-based hazard analysis technique.
Although there is no systematic approach to quantify the results
of STPA, Thomas (2013) provides a mathematical model un-
derlying STPA and a procedure to perform a STPA analysis
systematically in his thesis. This systematic execution of STPA
allows more objective analysis results compared to the ad-
hoc application in recent years.
Research on the potential effects of cyber-attacks on physi-
cal infrastructures in CPS is often performed from either an
ICT or a physical and control engineering perspective.
In the ICT domain, Dondossola et al. (2008) analyze poten-
tial cyber-attacks on power substation control systems. Their
research focus lies on the potential threats of cyber-attacks to
the ICT communication capabilities. Potential physical effects
are highlighted but no critical physical effects are achieved in
the experiments. Research like this is important to show that
specific vulnerabilities that are well known from the cyber
domain can be exploited in the context of a CPS. However, when
physical processes get enriched by ICT based communica-
tion, the physical safety measures stay in place. These safety
mechanisms are often used as an argument to downplay the
risk that cyber-attacks can have on the safe operation of these
systems. STPA-SafeSec considers existing safety mecha-
nisms during the analysis process and can therefore make a
stronger argument why cyber security vulnerabilities should
be taken seriously.
Wang and Lu (2013) highlight cyber-attacks on availability,
integrity and confidentiality, and their potential effects on dif-
ferent use cases and further present potential mitigation
strategies. Signatures and encryption are presented as cryp-
tographic countermeasures, and the difficulties that arise from
limited computing power and strict time constraints are ex-
plained. Network-based countermeasures are presented and
grouped by the targeted communication layers. The analysis
provides a good overview on the necessary security consider-
ations for CPS, but it is applied to a very generic smart grid
architecture. This makes it hard to draw conclusions from the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Please cite this article in press as: Ivo Friedberg, Kieran McLaughlin, Paul Smith, David Laverty, Sakir Sezer, STPA-SafeSec: Safety and security analysis for cyber-physical
systems, Journal of Information Security and Applications (2016), doi: 10.1016/j.jisa.2016.05.008
2 j o u rna l o f i n f o rma t i on s e cu r i t y and a p p l i c a t i on s ■■ ( 2 0 1 6 ) ■■ –■■
findings to a specific system at hand. STPA-SafeSec incorpo-
rates the generic aspects of these findings into an analysis
framework that an engineer can apply to a specific system.
Kundur et al. (2011) present a first step toward a graph-
based framework for modeling the physical impact of cyber-
attacks on smart grids. Two case studies show the application
of the framework in a Matlab environment based on two modi-
fied models of the IEEE 13 node distribution system. One case
study shows that a successful cyber-attack can cause a severe
under-frequency situation that ultimately results in a local
blackout. For the power grid, the application of Petri-nets and
attack trees to predict the load loss caused by identified weak-
nesses was presented by Ten et al. (2008). Laprie et al. (2007)
use state machines to show how transitions caused by attacks
can cause escalating, cascading and common cause failures.
The use of mathematical system models has the big benefit
that they can be validated and executed in an automated
fashion. But their design is very time consuming, the model-
ing techniques are not standardized and often no tool support
exists. For a system engineer who already has to perform a
safety analysis of the system, this often means incalculable
time effort that is not compulsory in most cases. STPA-
SafeSec can be used instead of another safety analysis
technique and includes the security analysis as a side product.
Srivastava et al. (2013) describe how an attacker can model
cyber and physical vulnerability of a grid to cyber-attacks based
on limited information. The authors present a cyber vulner-
ability ranking and how limited information about the grid can
be used to identify the most critical components to launch an
attack. In Ten et al. (2010) the authors present an automatic
cyber-security resilience framework for power grids that in-
corporates detection, reasoning and automatic mitigation
actions with a focus on the use of attack-trees for vulnerabil-
ity analysis. In order to implement this resilience framework
for a specific system architecture, a detailed analysis of the
cyber-security vulnerabilities, their potential physical effects
and the possible mitigation strategies is needed. The work by
Ten et al. does not describe how this information should be
acquired. STPA-SafeSec is designed to retrieve exactly this in-
formation from a system.
Sridhar et al. (2012) present a domain independent risk as-
sessment methodology for cyber-physical infrastructures. The
risk analysis starts with a detailed vulnerability assessment
of the infrastructure followed by an analysis of application and
physical system impact. Performing a complete vulnerability
analysis of a complex CPS like a power grid is very complex
and completeness is hard to prove. A better approach is to apply
a detailed vulnerability analysis only at the most critical com-
ponents identified by a previous impact analysis.That way, time
consuming tasks like penetration testing can be scheduled most
effectively. Further, penetration testing of a live CPS is ill-
advised when the potential effects of invalid component
behavior is not known. STPA-SafeSec provides the means to
identify the most critical system components for in-depth se-
curity analysis. It further highlights the potential system hazards
and system losses that can be caused by the malfunctioning
of a specific component.
Availability attacks on GPS signals by GPS jamming are pre-
sented by Hu and Wei (2009). The authors also elaborate on
countermeasures against GPS jamming in modern GPS receiv-
ers. Zhang et al. (2013) presents an integrity attack on GPS
signals with respect to time synchronization.The authors show
how the injection of targeted GPS signals increases the effect
of the attack in comparison to the arbitrary error introduced
by availability attacks.The relevance of such research on a spe-
cific CPS is often hard to identify. Whether there are devices
deployed in the infrastructure that rely on GPS and what the
impact of a jammed or manipulated signal would be are ques-
tions that are hard to answer. STPA-SafeSec provides the means
to identify the dependencies of specific components on spe-
cific communication links and the impact of different attack
categories.
Attack trees are one of the best established graphical se-
curity models. First introduced by Weiss (1991) as threat logic
trees, their similarity to fault trees (Vesely et al., 1981) indi-
cates that their roots are in the safety domain. Salter et al. (1998)
first used the term attack tree, while Kordy et al. (2014) provide
a timely summary of the different approaches that were de-
veloped since then. Given the dominance of tree structures in
both, the safety and the security domain, a tree structure is
leveraged by STPA-SafeSec to connect and present the final
analysis results. The tree can then be extended by the results
of an in-depth security analysis. Further, approaches to attach
cost factors or probabilities to traditional attack trees have the
potential to make the results of STPA-SafeSec quantifiable.
3. The STPA-SafeSec approach
3.1. Motivation
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) rely increasingly on the inter-
connectivity of devices. This caused increasing attention for
cyber-security alongside traditional analysis techniques. The
presentation of STPA-sec by Young and Leveson (2013, 2014)
was an attempt by the community around STAMP and STPA
toward addressing this requirement. STPA-sec shows that STPA
can also be used to analyze the security of systems. It changes
the traditional bottom-up approach to security — where threats
are used to derive the security requirements — to a top-
down approach where the outcomes are relevant (Young and
Leveson, 2013). A top-down approach could also be sup-
ported by other safety analysis techniques (e.g. FTA, HAZOP)
but Sect. 2 highlighted the benefits of STPA over these
approaches.
However, STPA can be used for more than just the analy-
sis of system safety or security to prevent hazards and losses.
It can be further generalized to analyze a system with respect
to all relevant emerging system properties. An emerging system
property is a property that arises through the interaction of
parts of the system, while the parts themselves do not nec-
essarily have the same property. Safety and security are
examples of such emerging system properties. Previous pub-
lications on STPA-sec (Young and Leveson, 2013, 2014) suggest
that security analysis is always performed to ensure system
safety. Further, the publications indicate that there is a differ-
ence between the use of STPA for safety and STPA-sec for
security. Sect. 1 argues that safety and security need to be ad-
dressed collectively. This collective approach is possible with
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STPA. However, the current presentations of STPA have a set
of limiting factors that are addressed in this work.
(i) It is not made clear that STPA and STPA-sec are the same
analysis. Only a collective analysis of safety and secu-
rity allows the analyst to identify the dependencies
between both properties and derive the most optimal
results.
(ii) There is no guidance to an integrated approach of safety
and security using STPA where safety and security are
considered equally important properties that affect each
other. Rather, STPA-sec argues that security is only rel-
evant with respect to its impact on safety.This is a limited
view on the system. In the socio-technical context of
modern cyber-physical systems monetary loss to the op-
erator should be considered a critical system loss. This
loss can occur by a breach of confidentiality (e.g. con-
sumer data or intellectual properties) without direct
implications for safety. Subsequently, traditional STPA-
sec needs to be extended to enable the analyst to consider
this type of losses that are not directly safety related.
(iii) STPA-sec does not provide guidance on how to perform
the security analysis once the critical system aspects are
defined. First, it does not extend the causal factors pre-
sented for the safety domain into the security domain.
This makes the analysis harder and limits comparabil-
ity between different analysis results. Further, STPA-
sec does not provide any means to integrate well
established security analysis techniques.This is a problem
not only for the acceptance of STPA for security analy-
sis. It is also important for the quality of the analysis to
get detailed results from penetration testing for example.
Not all security constraints can be ensured in the physi-
cal and safety driven system domain. To derive the most
effective system design STPA has to be able to guide
manual analysis and integrate the results.
A general overview of STPA-SafeSec is given in Fig. 1. It aims
to address the above mentioned shortcomings and intro-
duces the following improvements over tradition STPA methods.
(i) The description and evaluation of a unified approach to
safety and security analysis based on STPA and STPA-
sec. This approach prioritizes safety and security equally
and allows to detect a broader set of hazard scenarios.
(ii) An extension of the safety focused causal factor guid-
ance of STPA into the security domain. This extension
provides support for the analyst and makes the results
more comparable.
(iii) A method to link the abstract control structure to the
physical system design to integrate the results from tra-
ditional security analysis methods. Based on the physical
system design, traditional security analysis techniques
can be used complementary to STPA-SafeSec. Further,
the results allow an intelligent application of time con-
suming analysis tasks to the most critical parts of the
system.
The approach contains two loops. Modern cyber-physical
systems are not static but evolve over time, influenced by their
socio-technical environment. The outer loop highlights that
STPA-SafeSec is an iterative approach that needs to be reap-
plied through the lifetime of the system to manage this evolving
nature. In its core, STPA is based around constraints and the
control loops of the system. To manage the complexity of
modern systems, each control loop is analyzed separately during
the analysis; this is shown by the inner loop.
The constraints are first refined for the system as a whole
based on the losses that should be prevented. Then, these con-
straints get refined and mapped to the control layer; the
representation of the control loops and their interaction.
Hazards and subsequent losses happen, when control actions
that violate one or more of the previously defined constraints
— so called hazardous control actions — are taken. The analy-
sis provides the means to derive the causal factors that lead
to these hazardous control actions. These causal factors are
extended by STPA-SafeSec to encompass security consider-
ations. Further, the abstract control layer gets mapped to an
implementation specific component layer.This component layer
provides the means to further refine the constraints and derive
more specific causal factors. It can further guide in-depth se-
curity analysis. The final results — a set of changes that need
to be applied to the system architecture to ensure loss free op-
eration — are finally derived based on the scenarios that
describe how hazardous control actions are caused due to causal
factors.
3.2. STPA-SafeSec approach in detail
Beside the description of a unified approach to the analysis,
STPA-SafeSec provide two core contributions to the analysis.
The first contribution is the description of a generic component
layer diagram shown in Fig. 2. To evaluate whether security
Define Control
Layer
For every control loop
Identify
Hazardous
Control Actions
Refine
Constraints
Map Control &
Component
Layer
Define Hazard
Scenarios
In-Depth
Security
Analysis
Identify
Mitigation
Strategiesi
ii
iii
iii
Fig. 1 – A simplified view on the steps that are performed
during an STPA-SafeSec analysis. The solid arrows indicate
the order in which the steps are taken. Dashed arrows
indicate where STPA-SafeSec is iterated. Black circles label
at what steps the extensions of STPA-SafeSec are applied.
At first, the control layer is defined for the whole system
that is comprised of different control loops. Each control
loop is then analyzed in detail to define scenarios of how
system flaws or malicious actions can cause system
hazards. Based on all scenarios, the most effective
mitigation strategies in the system can be identified.
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constraints are ensured, the focus of the analysis needs to
expand from the more abstract control layer of the system to
a new component layer. STPA introduced the generic control struc-
ture diagram to help the analyst to identify the control loops
of a system. While the control layer focuses on functional in-
teractions, control concepts and algorithms, the component
layer visualizes the system implementation. This includes the
nodes at which control algorithms or sensors are deployed as
well as network nodes, physical network connections and ap-
plication level protocols used.
The second contribution is the extension of causal factors
into the security domain. STPA provides a generic causal factor
diagram that presents the factors that lead to hazardous control
actions. However, the factors do not include active actions with
malicious intent. We derived a set of factors that describe the
effects of cyber attacks on integrity and availability shown in
Tables 1 and 2. In a first step, this extension provides the analyst
a list of factors to consider. However, in combination with the
component layer, STPA-SafeSec also provides a guidance for
the mapping of causal factors between the control and the com-
ponent layer. For each attack effect, our guidance shows the
capabilities that are required by the attacker at component layer
to achieve the malicious effect. For example, if missing feed-
back is identified as a causal factor for a hazardous control
action, availability constraints should be placed at the physi-
cal communication network between sensor and controller as
well as on the sensor’s feedback mechanism. Table 2 can then
show that either network nodes, end-nodes or the physical com-
munication link can be attacked to achieve a delay or loss in
communication.
STPA-SafeSec relies on these two extensions to provide a
unified analysis approach shown in detail in Fig. 3. The two
loops from Fig. 1 can be seen again. The iterative application
Controller
FeedbackCo
nt
ro
l
Ext. I/O
Actuator
Output
Ex
t.
 I\
O
Control Input
Sensor
Input
Ext. I\O
Feedback Output
Physical 
Process
Ph
ysical State
In
pu
t
Arbitrary Network
Network Device
Device
Network Connection 
(wired, wireless)
Fig. 2 – Generic component layer diagram for a simple control loop. This diagram shows the potential physical components
involved in a control loop and can be used together with Tables 1 and 2 to identify security constraints and perform in-
depth security analysis.
Table 1 – General integrity threats. A full circle indicates
that attack capabilities on the specified entity are
sufficient to exploit the threat. Half circles indicate
capabilities needed but not sufficient.
# Description Protocol
CSTR-I-1 Command injection ● ◐ ◐ ◐
CSTR-I-2 Command drop ● ● ● ○
CSTR-I-3 Command manipulation ● ◐ ○ ◐
CSTR-I-4 Command delay ● ● ● ○
CSTR-I-5 Measurement injection ● ◐ ◐ ◐
CSTR-I-6 Measurement drop ● ● ● ○
CSTR-I-7 Measurement manipulation ● ◐ ○ ◐
CSTR-I-8 Measurement delay ● ● ● ○
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Please cite this article in press as: Ivo Friedberg, Kieran McLaughlin, Paul Smith, David Laverty, Sakir Sezer, STPA-SafeSec: Safety and security analysis for cyber-physical
systems, Journal of Information Security and Applications (2016), doi: 10.1016/j.jisa.2016.05.008
5j o u rna l o f i n f o rma t i on s e cu r i t y and a p p l i c a t i on s ■■ ( 2 0 1 6 ) ■■ –■■
of the top-down analysis to cover the effects of the socio-
technical environment on the system is shown by the System
Refinement loop. Within this analysis, the Control Loop Analysis
loop is used to manage the system complexity.The control loops
can be considered in a hierarchical structure where the simple
loops that have no further dependencies build the lowest level.
Each step during the analysis produces artifacts. These ar-
tifacts are the result of the analysis and allow to identify
shortcomings in the system design and to trace them back to
system losses. The analyst first identifies high level system
losses, before the system hazards are identified based on these
losses. In traditional STPA, safety constraints are then derived
from the set of identified hazards (see also steps II-IV in Fig. 3).
In STPA-SafeSec, system-wide security constraints are defined
alongside safety constraints. Once the constraints are identi-
fied, a control layer is built in step V. This control layer is the
counterpart to the safety control structure in STPA. It is a graphi-
cal representation of the control loops in the system and the
interactions between the different controllers. Further, the safety
and security constraints are considered collectively and mapped
to the different aspects of this control layer. The control layer
builds the basis for further steps of the analysis.
The Control Loop Analysis loop aims to identify causal factors
in the system operation that lead to a violation of either safety
or security constraints. As shown by Fig. 1, hazardous sce-
narios are defined that describe in detail how a specific
constraint gets violated. Steps IV-XIII describe in detail how each
control loop is analyzed in order to identify these hazardous
scenarios. Based on the hazardous scenarios, mitigation strat-
egies can be applied to the system design to address the initially
identified safety constraints (XV).
Table 2 – General availability threats.
# Description Protocol
CSTR-A-1 Communication delay ● ● ● ○
CSTR-A-2 Communication dropped ● ● ● ○
CSTR-A-3 Node overloaded (delay) ● ● ○ ○
CSTR-A-4 Node overloaded (drop) ● ● ○ ○
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Fig. 3 – Flow diagram of integrated safety and security analysis based on STPA. The process in the middle describes the
sequence of the tasks to be performed during the analysis. Each task can produce artifacts (to the left of a task) and can
leverage support mechanisms from the framework (to the right of the task). Two loops highlight the iterative nature of the
analysis.
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Hazardous control actions can be defined in a semi-
automated manner as defined by Thomas (2013). Based on
the set of hazardous control actions STPA-SafeSec leverages
the generic causal factor diagram as well as the set of integrity
and availability threats presented in Tables 1 and 2 to iden-
tify the causal factors. Step XI in the flow diagram (Fig. 3) is
introduced with STPA-SafeSec to generate a mapping between
the control level representation of each control loop and its
component level representation. This mapping shows what
algorithms run on which physical components, and which
networks are used for each abstract communication path. In
steps XI and XII — before the hazardous scenarios are iden-
tified — both safety and security constraints are refined and
mapped to the component layer. This allows the analyst to
enrich safety constraints on the control layer with security
constraints at component layer; again Tables 1 and 2 can be
used for guidance.
Based on this information, hazardous scenarios are derived.
Because constraints are derived from each other, hazardous
scenarios can be refined and represented in a hierarchical tree
structure. In the example of feedback availability, the root sce-
nario would be a violation of the safety constraint that states
that the feedback has to be available. Child scenarios in the
security domain represent a violation of the availability con-
straint on each relevant component respectively. Further
scenarios can be identified in the safety domain with respect
to reliability of sensors for example.
Finally, the component layer of the system can be used in
step XIV to guide a detailed security analysis. Based on the most
critical constraints at the control level, the constraints at the
component level determine which components should be pri-
oritized for in-depth security analysis. Identified vulnerabilities
can be seen as potential violations of these security con-
straints. Thus, the potential system losses that can be caused
by various cyber-attacks can be traced through the scenario
tree to potential system losses. It is further possible to iden-
tify the most effective mitigation strategies. A set of mitigation
strategies is effective if it mitigates all paths in the scenario
trees to a root scenario. The correlation between safety and
security constraints, as well as the mapping between control
and component layer, are enablers for mitigation strategies and
to identify the minimal set that is most effective. For example,
security related vulnerabilities might not be resolvable when
legacy equipment cannot be replaced. Depending on the vul-
nerability, a mitigation strategy at the control layer can instead
mitigate the violation of the related safety constraint. In this
situation, an attack would still be possible, but a hazard cannot
be achieved by the attacker.
STPA-SafeSec addresses the shortcomings of STPA and STPA-
sec that were presented in Sect. 3.1. It provides one integrated
approach to analyze safety and security aspects in a single
framework. That way it eliminates the need to perform steps
of the analysis repeatedly and reduce the risk of misunder-
standings. STPA-SafeSec guidance for the analyst during the
identification of security constraints and allows a better pri-
oritization of time consuming tasks during the detailed security
analysis phase (e.g. penetration testing). Finally, the integra-
tion of safety and security constraints into one multi-layered
representation of the system highlights the dependencies
between the two domains.
4. Synchronous islanding use case
This section presents an introduction to the use case for the
analysis performed in Sect. 5. It is based around the concept
of synchronous-islanded operation microgrids. With the in-
creasing penetration of the traditional power grid with
renewable energy sources — e.g. photovoltaics (PV) or wind tur-
bines — emerged the need for finer control capabilities. Farhangi
(2010) and Considine et al. (2012) among others identify
microgrids as one way to manage the complexity of the future
smart grid. It allows for an effective integration of renewable
energy sources, but introduces new requirements for the tighter
integration of ICT resources. A microgrid is a potentially in-
dependent subset of any host grid where generation, storage
and load are in close local proximity. It is characterized by its
ability to operate either connected to the host grid or — for
example in case of a fault on the host grid — as an indepen-
dent power island. For most types of microgrids, independent
operation is only possible for a limited amount of time. To
prevent blackouts in the microgrid during reconnection, it has
to be possible for microgrids to be dynamically added and
removed from the host grid during operation. Synchronous-
islanded operation of microgrids is seen as one way to tackle
this challenge. Even in islanding mode, the power metrics —
voltage magnitudes (Xm), frequency (ω) and phase angle (ϕ) — are
kept synchronized with the host grid. When these power
metrics are matched between the islanded microgrid and the
host, circuit breaker re-closure is safe. If synchronization is not
guaranteed, re-closure of circuit breakers has to be prohibited.
A universally applicable method for synchronous-islanding
is presented by Best et al. (2008). The authors describe general
requirements and possible limitations caused by time-delay
introduced when transmitting the reference signal. Control logic
is used to control the difference in frequency between the
systems while it minimizes the current phase angle differ-
ence. Challenges like islanding detection and control initiation
are covered as well as issues with power quality and security
mechanisms in the case of a communication loss.
Synchronous-islanded operation enforces strict transmis-
sion delay constraints on the underlying communication
network. Laverty et al. (2008) perform a detailed analysis on
the effect of the time delay introduced by wide-area telecom-
munications. In their work, the authors show the response of
an alternator operated by an Internet-based phase difference
controller to local load acceptances. They were able to show
that control is effective when it is operated on a telecommu-
nication link with variable time delay such as the Internet.
Caldon et al. (2004) evaluate the effects of synchronous and
inverter-interfaced generators on the stability of power islands.
The authors show that inverter-interfaced generators in-
crease the stability of frequency and phase angle difference.
Fig. 4 shows a high level representation of the synchronous-
islanding testbed that will be analyzed in this paper. It is
designed to operate an alternator, driven by the prime mover
(in this case a DC machine), in a synchronized manner with
the main grid while in islanded mode. The Generator Set is a
DC Motor/Alternator set. The DC motor is supplied from a
‘Eurotherm 590 + ’ digital prime mover controller; it offers ana-
logue inputs to control the set points on the drive. Phasor
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Measurement Units (PMUs) are a measurement device that cap-
tures voltage magnitudes (Xm), frequency (ω) and phase angle (ϕ)
periodically and transmits it to the configured receiver. For PMU
measurements to be useful, they need to be taken at the exactly
same time at every place in the grid. This clock synchroniza-
tion is commonly achieved with GPS signals, although
alternative methods are possible. In our testbed PMUs are de-
ployed at the host grid and within the power island. The
collected power metrics are then transmitted to the control-
ler. The Load Bank is a 3-phase resistive load bank deployed
within the power island. It can be used to evaluate the behav-
ior of the controlled island under shifting loads. The Controller
collects the measurements from the PMUs and adapts the set
points of the generator set.
For a more detailed instruction on the use case we refer the
reader to Friedberg et al. (2015).
5. Analysis
In this section we will apply STPA-SafeSec to the synchronous-
islanding use case. The testbed model in Fig. 4 shows a high
level view of the architecture. During our analysis we fol-
lowed the detailed STPA-SafeSec flow diagram given in Fig. 3.
This section is divided into subsections where each repre-
sents one step in the simple STPA-SafeSec diagram in Fig. 1.
How hazard scenarios are used to guide the in-depth secu-
rity analysis and how the results can be used to derive
mitigation strategies will be covered in Sect. 6. During the analy-
sis, we will use a set of acronyms to refer to the different
artifacts that result form the analysis. Table 3 highlights the
different acronyms and their meaning.
5.1. Defining the safety control structure
We define the system under analysis as the control of the gen-
erator set in the different system states. In the first steps we
identify system losses and system hazards based on expert
knowledge. There is no formal process provided but system
losses and hazards are in general high level properties. We can
define losses for our system as follows: (L-1) Injury to humans,
(L-2) damage to power equipment, (L-3) damage to end-user
equipment and (L-4) interruption of power supply to con-
sumer loads. Based on the system losses, system hazards are
identified: (H-1) Out-of-sync reclosure, (H-2) operation of power
equipment outside of operational limits, (H-3) violation of power
quality metrics, (H-4) inability to achieve synchronization and
(H-5) inability to meet local demand. Hazard H-2 can be further
refined for the concrete system as: The generator set should
not be operated at an analog set-point outside the range 0 V−5 V,
since there is only one critical power equipment in the archi-
tecture; the generator set. Hazard H-3 should be split into H-3.1
(Power quality violation regarding voltage) and H-3.2 (Power
quality violation regarding frequency). Table 4 shows which
losses are potentially caused by each hazard.
The next step is to derive high level safety and security con-
straints for the system under evaluation (see step IV in Fig. 3).
The easiest way to identify high level constraints is by nega-
WANPMU Controller SPI
Circuit
Breaker
Load Bank
PMUCommunication
Power
Prime
Mover
Alternator
Prime Mover
Controller
Generator Set
Fig. 4 – Overview on the testbed architecture. A generator set is operated synchronous with the main grid while in
islanding mode. A Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) at a remote, secure location in the main grid communicates with a local
controller. A second PMU measures the power metrics in the island. The controller compares the measurements from the
two PMUs and controls the generator.
Table 3 – List of acronyms used to reference the different
analysis artifacts throughout this work. X acts as a
placeholder for the numbering.
Acronym Description
L-X System losses
H-X System hazards
F-X System flaws
HC-X Hazardous control actions
CTRL-N-X Node at control layer
CTRL-C-X Connection at control layer
CPT-N-X Node at component layer
CPT-C-X Connection at component layer
CSTR-S-X Safety constraint
CSTR-A-X Availability constraint
CSTR-I-X Integrity constraint
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tion of the identified system hazards (CSTR-S-1 − CSTR-S-5
respectively). The resulting constraints can be safety and se-
curity related, depending on the hazard. In the use-case at hand,
no high-level security constraints were derived. However, this
does not mean that we are considering a pure safety use case.
At this first stage we look at the overall system operation and
decide what we have to ensure to prevent losses from a top-
down perspective. During the analysis we will refine these
constraints and show that security needs to be considered as
well to grasp the complexity of the system.
Fig. 5 gives a detailed view on the control level represen-
tation of the system under evaluation (step V). The traditional
STPA analysis provides a generic control layer diagram to guide
the generation of this control level representation. Fig. 5 is de-
signed based on the control loop in Fig. 4. The equivalence
between the two control loops is not obvious. In the original
STPA documentation the flow of control commands and in-
formation in a control loop is represented in a counter clockwise
fashion. Traditionally control loops are represented as a clock-
wise loop (as done in Fig. 4). STPA-SafeSec uses the STPA way
of counter clockwise representation.
We identified one control loop — the Speed Controller — and
its interaction with the different logical components in the
system. Each node (CTRL-N) and each connection (CTRL-C) at
the control layer are labeled to allow clear reference in the text.
For simplicity, the prefix CTRL- is omitted in the figure. In the
heart of the control loop is the Speed Controller (CTRL-N-1). It
receives feedback from the two PMUs in the local microgrid
(CTRL-N-4) and the host grid (CTRL-N-5) via two separate con-
nections (CTRL-C-4 and CTRL-C-5). Each PMU reports the
measured voltage magnitude (Xm), frequency (ω) and phase angle
(ϕ) periodically. Further, the controller checks if synchroniza-
tion is achieved and circuit breaker reclosure is therefore safe
or unsafe and transmits this information to the circuit breaker
controller (CTRL-C-6, CTRL-N-6). The circuit breaker controller
is not implemented as an automatic control loop due to safety
reasons in the testbed. Instead a human operator acts as the
circuit breaker controller. Finally, the speed controller can define
a set point (CTRL-C-1) for the generator set (CTRL-N-3) over the
DC Drive (CTRL-N-2).
5.2. Hazardous control actions
Based on the control layer diagram, Table 5 shows the iden-
tified system variables that are relevant for the correct operation
of the speed controller (see steps VII and VIII). It further shows
the control commands that the controller can issue. For each
variable, the value space needs to be broken up into discrete
steps that are safety relevant. This allows an automatic enu-
meration through the different system states to identify the
potential hazardous scenarios later on (see also Thomas, 2013
for details). To achieve synchronization, the speed controller
needs to calculate the difference in the power metrics between
host grid and microgrid. We define the following variables as
the difference of voltage magnitude, frequency and phase angle
between the local microgrid and the host grid:
ΔX mh mm t X t X t( ) = ( ) − ( )μ (1)
Δω μω ωt t th( ) = ( ) − ( ) (2)
Δφ μφ φt t th( ) = ( ) − ( ) (3)
For the difference in power metrics, two system states can
be identified. The difference can either be small enough that
circuit-breaker reclosure is safe (within limits) or not. For each
possible control action a decision has to be made whether the
control action is hazardous in a given system state or not. A
control action in STPA can be hazardous if (i) it is applied at
all, (ii) it is applied too early, (iii) it is applied too late or (iv) if
it is not applied in a given system state. Table 6 shows a list
of the hazardous control actions identified for the speed con-
troller. A hazardous control action is present for a specific
system state and can cause a set of hazards. HC-1 - HC-3 de-
scribe the cases where the speed controller wrongfully assumes
that synchronization is achieved. It would then indicate that
the reclosure of the circuit breaker is safe while it is not. This
can cause out-of-sync reclosure (H-1) or power quality viola-
tions (H-3). In this case, it does not matter when the control
command to the circuit breaker controller (CTRL-N-6) is sent,
as any occurrence of the command in this system state is po-
tentially hazardous. HC-4 highlights that the set-point to the
Table 4 – Losses that can be caused by each identified
hazard.
Hazard L1 L2 L3 L4
H-1 x x x x
H-2 x x x x
H-3.1 x x
H-3.2 x x
H-4 x
H-5 x
Prime Mover 
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Local PMU
Speed 
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Fig. 5 – Control layer diagram for synchronous-islanding
test case. Gray blocks highlight logical nodes, while white
blocks describe the type of variables and commands
transmitted between the nodes. Black circles are labels to
logical nodes. Block triangles are labels to logical
connections. Each label has CTRL- as prefix in the text
which is omitted in the figure for simplicity.
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generator set must not be outside the operational limits for
the generator set. Again, the timing of the command is irrel-
evant, as is the state of the circuit breaker and the power quality
metrics. Finally, HC-5 shows that it is hazardous for the speed
controller to miss a valid update of the set-point to the gen-
erator set if the circuit breaker is open. In this case, the local
supply of local loads depends solely on the power generated
by the generator set. Failure to adjust the power output to
changing load situations can cause power loss, power quality
violations and consequently damage to consumer equipment.
5.3. Map control to component layer
Now that we have identified the cases in which certain control
actions cause system hazards, the goal is to identify the system
flaws that enable hazardous control actions. In traditional STPA
this is done solely in the safety domain. In our integrated ap-
proach, we also include the violation of security constraints
as potential causal factors. Therefore, we map the control layer
given by Fig. 5 to the physical component layer. Fig. 6 shows
the component layer for our synchronous islanding testbed.
The nodes in Fig. 5 are still visible but represented by nodes
at the component layer (CPT-N). The same is true for control
layer connections that are now represented by connections at
the component layer (CPT-C). Component layer nodes and con-
nections are the architectural implementation of the high level
control layer in the physical world. While the generator set
(CTRL-N-3) is implemented by one physical component (CPT-
N-4), the implementation of other nodes and connections is
significantly more complex. The speed controller (CTRL-N-1) is
actually implemented by two nodes. First, a Raspberry Pi (CPT-
N-1) is used to handle the control algorithm and to manage
the IP based communication to the local network (CPT-C-7). An
additional micro-controller (CPT-N-2) is connected via serial link
(CPT-C-1) and converts the digital control signal of the Pi to an
analog signal required by the DC drive. This shows how one
node at the control layer is represented by a combination of
nodes and connections in the component layer. The represen-
tation of PMU devices (CTRL-N-4, CTRL-N-5) is also more
complex. The component layer highlights the dependency of
PMUs on a GPS signal. An additional GPS antenna compo-
nent is introduced (CPT-N-6, CPT-N-10) together with a wireless
communication link to the GPS system. Finally, the IP based
communication between PMUs and speed controller is shown
in more detail. Where the control level only highlighted the
fact that a communication exists between PMUs and control-
ler (CTRL-C-4, CTRL-C-5) the component layer highlights the full
complexity. Network nodes like switches (CPT-N-7) and firewalls
(CPT-N-8) are shown as well as different network enclaves. The
component diagram also highlights that safety and security
constraints can be placed in the local network where network
components are known. The Wide Area Network (WAN) that
is used to transport data from the host grid PMU on the other
hand is not under control of the system architects. There-
fore, constraints cannot be ensured and mitigation strategies
need to be in place to ensure safety and security.
With the mapping between control and component level
achieved we can identify high level design flaws that can lead
to hazardous control actions. Again we can leverage existing
tools from traditional STPA. It provides a generic causal factor
diagram to provide the potential design flaws that can have a
safety implication (see Leveson, 2011, p. 223). After applying
this to our use case we derived the following flaws in our
system: F-1: Controller incorrectly believes that voltage dif-
ference is within limits; F-2: Controller incorrectly believes that
frequency difference is within limits; F-3: Controller incor-
rectly believes that phase angle difference is within limits; F-4:
Setpoints outside of the operational limits is received by DC
Drive; F-5: Speed controller incorrectly believes that no setpoint
correction is required; F-6: Circuit breaker controller incor-
rectly receives information that reclosure is safe. In traditional
STPA the next step would be to identify hazardous scenarios
(see step XIII in Fig. 3). Instead we first refine the safety and
security constraints of the system based on the control and
the component layer. To mitigate F-1 - F-3 as well as F-5 and
F-6, safety and security constraints need to be ensured on the
feedback mechanisms of the system. For F-6 further con-
straints are required at the controller as well as at the
communication to the circuit breaker controller. F-4 needs to
be ensured at the controller and actuator as well as at the com-
munication to the actuator and to the generator set.
Table 5 – System variables that are relevant for the
correct operation of the speed controller and their
possible values.
# Name Values
ΔXm t( ) Voltage magnitude
difference
Within limits; outside limits
Δω(t) Frequency difference Within limits; outside limits
Δϕ(t) Phase angle difference Within limits; outside limits
Csp Command to prime
mover
Within limits 0-5; outside limits
Ccb Command to circuit
breaker
CB reclosure safe; CB reclosure
unsafe
Stcb Circuit breaker status Open; closed
Table 6 – Hazardous control actions by different system states. A ‘–’ indicates that the status of the variable is irrelevant
for the hazardous behavior of the highlighted control action. A control action can either be hazardous at any time it is
performed in a given state, or only if provided too early or too late or not at all.
# Ccb Csp Stcb ΔXm Δω Δϕ Any time Too early Too late Not Hazards
HC-1 Safe – Open Out – – 1 1 1 0 H-1, H-3
HC-2 Safe – Open – Out – 1 1 1 0 H-1, H-3
HC-3 Safe – Open – – Out 1 1 1 0 H-1, H-3
HC-4 – Out – – – – 1 1 1 0 H-2
HC-5 – In Open – – – 0 0 1 1 H-3, H-4, H-5
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5.4. Refine safety and security constraints
Based on the set of system flaws, Fig. 7 highlights what secu-
rity and safety constraints can be violated at each node and
connection at control level. High level security threats align with
the threats presented in Tables 1 and 2 from Sect. 3.2. The set
of safety constraints is taken from the hazards that can be
caused at each node or connection.
To achieve a better understanding of how hazardous sce-
narios manifest, the constraints need to be mapped to the
component layer. These steps are unique to STPA-SafeSec and
build the core contribution to the analysis. They allow STPA-
SafeSec to overcome the shortcomings of previous approaches.
We will see that this is a fairly complex task that results in a
lot of data. For space limitations, we will describe the con-
straint mapping only for the three most interesting cases.
5.4.1. The local PMU device
The first case is the local PMU device (CTRL-N-4). We can see
from Fig. 7 that malfunction of CTRL-N-4 can lead to out-of-
sync reclosure, violation of power quality and failure to meet
local demand. All three hazards can only be caused when the
circuit breaker is open (see Table 6). The PMU is further ex-
pected to be reliable; under expected circumstances, the
measurement quality is supposed to match the expectations
on the device. A cyber-attack on CTRL-N-4 can cause feed-
back to be unavailable to the controller (CSTR-A-1 and CSTR-
A-2) or violate the integrity of the feedback (CSTR-I-5 - CSTR-I-8).
CTRL-N-4 is actually represented by two nodes at compo-
nent layer. First there is the PMU device (CPT-N-5) but there is
also a GPS antenna attached (CPT-N-6). The mapping of cyber-
security constraints from control to component layer can be
automated with the use of Tables 1 and 2.They show the imple-
mentation aspects that need to ensure a specific security
constraint at the control layer.The STPA-SafeSec process derives
that all security constraints on CTRL-N-4 need to be ensured
by CPT-N-5. Further analysis needs to be performed to ensure
the safety constraints given the concrete implementation. The
connection between CPT-N-5 and CPT-N-6 is hardwired and can
be considered stable and secure as long as both endpoints are
but we need to extend constraints to the GPS connection.
Known attacks exist that can spoof (see Zhang et al., 2013) or
jam (see Hu and Wei, 2009) a GPS signal. Therefore, CSTR-A-1
and CSTR-A-2 need to be ensured on CPT-N-6 and CPT-C-5.
Further, depending on the PMU implementation, failure to
receive a correct GPS signal can cause invalid or missing feed-
back. The controller will be able to detect an error in clock
synchronization; therefore, out-of-sync reclosure can be
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Fig. 6 – Component layer diagram of synchronous-islanding use-case. Dashed boxes indicate the representation of
components at control level. Solid lines are wired connections while dashed lines indicate wireless communication. Black
lines show direct end-to-end connections. Gray lines show IP based transportation. Black circles label concrete nodes while
black triangles label concrete connections.
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prevented. But the lack of valid feedback will not allow the con-
troller to stabilize the system when it is disconnected from the
host grid. Violation of power quality and inability to meet local
demand are possible. Therefore, the reliability of the PMU
depends on the reliability of the GPS connection (CPT-C-5).
Table 7 shows a summary of the hazards that can be caused
by a violation of each constraint at each concrete node and
concrete connection. We can see that reliable time synchro-
nization as well as timely availability of the local PMU
measurements are necessary to achieve system stability in is-
landed operation. However, unavailable feedback, delays and
missing clock synchronization can be detected to prevent out-
of-sync reclosure. Therefore, out-of-sync reclosure can only be
caused by faulty or manipulated measurements.
5.4.2. The speed controller
Fig. 7 highlights the speed controller (CTRL-N-1) as the most
critical node. A malfunction or a successful cyber attack on the
speed controller can cause all potential system hazards. But
in order to identify the relevant factors we need to under-
stand the component layer structure of the speed controller.
It is built of two concrete nodes: (i) a Raspberry Pi (CPT-N-1) that
handles the IP based traffic from the feedback as well as the
control logic and (ii) a Digital2Analog converter that takes the
digital control signal to the prime mover controller (CPT-N-2)
and transfers it to an analog signal between 0 V and 5 V. The
devices are hard-wired over USB (CPT-C-1). From the hazards
in Fig. 7, out-of-sync reclosure (H 1), violation of power quality
(H 3) and inability to meet local demand (H 5) can be caused
by CPT-N-1. Only the operational limits of the generator set need
to be ensured by CPT-N-2. Further, CPT-N-2 is not connected to
any network directly.Therefore its integrity in the cyber domain
depends on the integrity of CPT-N-1. This shows that the reli-
ability and the integrity of CPT-N-1 should have highest priority
among all devices in the system.
5.4.3. Wide area connection between remote PMU
and controller
The final case that we investigate in detail is the connection
between the remote host-based PMU and the speed control-
ler (CTRL-C-5). Under the assumption that we already addressed
the possibility that the speed controller is compromised in the
previous section, we can now focus on the communication.
Fig. 7 shows that the incorrect behavior of the communication
Fig. 7 – Mapping between safety and security constraints and the logical nodes and connections at the control layer (see
Fig. 5).
Table 7 – This table highlights which hazards can be
caused by a violation of the different constraints at each
concrete component and concrete connection mapped
to by CTRL-N-4.
CPT-N-5 CPT-N-6 CPT-C-5
CSTR-I-5 H-1, H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
CSTR-I-6 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
CSTR-I-7 H-1, H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
CSTR-I-8 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
CSTR-A-1 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
CSTR-A-2 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
Reliability H-1, H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5 H-3, H-5
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link can cause out-of-sync reclosure, power quality viola-
tions and failure to meet local demand. However, power quality
violations and failure to meet local demand can, in this case,
only be caused as a consequence of out-of-sync reclosure. The
local speed controller would not cause these hazards solely
based on the feedback from the host grid; local feedback and
local stability would take priority. Therefore, only one hazard
needs to be investigated in detail: H-1.
The component layer (Fig. 6) highlights the complexity of
the connection. Traffic from the PMU is routed through a wide
area network to the local network of the microgrid (CPT-C-7).
There it has to pass through a firewall (CPT-N-8) to a network
switch (CPT-N-7) before it can reach the controller. Again, Tables 1
and 2 provide the required mapping. However, the network com-
ponents in the WAN are not controlled by the system architects.
It is therefore not possible to ensure any safety or security con-
straints on this network (neither on the network nodes, nor
on the physical layer). Table 8 shows which constraints have
to be ensured at each component. Since there is only one
system hazard (H-1) to ensure, the table structure deviates from
the structure in Table 7.
To ensure reliability for the WAN connection (CPT-C-7), service
level agreements (SLAs) need to be in place between the op-
erators of the WAN and the grid operators. Availability
constraints in the cyber domain (CSTR-A-1 - CSTR-A-4) are also
covered by these SLAs for CPT-C-7, as are CSTR-I-6 (measure-
ments dropped) and CSTR-I-8 (measurements delayed).The only
aspect of CPT-C-7 with respect to data integrity that is still con-
trolled by the grid operator is the communication protocol (see
Table 1). To ensure message integrity (CSTR-I-5 and CSTR-I-7)
at CPT-C-7 we need to place integrity checks at protocol level.
These can be end-to-end encryption (either at the applica-
tion layer, or by using a Virtual Private Network (VPN)) or digital
signatures. In Table 8 the constraints on CPT-C-7 are split into
those that need to be ensured by SLAs and those that need
to be ensured at the application layer of the communication
protocol.
In the internal network, a wider approach is needed. Miti-
gation strategies on the network switch (CPT-N-7) and the
firewall (CPT-N-8) need to be balanced. Purely based on CTRL-
C-5, two constraints can be placed at the firewall (CPT-N-8). First,
valid traffic from CPT-N-9 needs to be allowed to pass into the
local network. Second, the firewall needs to block malicious
traffic that targets the availability or integrity of the network
switch (CPT-N-7). The network switch should — to any extent
possible — ensure message integrity (CSTR-I-5 - CSTR-I-8) and
communication availability (CSTR-A-1 - CSTR-I-4). Based on the
open structure of typical network protocols (e.g. ARP, DNS) this
might not be possible for all constraints.
5.5. Define hazard scenarios
In the previous section we highlighted how safety and secu-
rity constraints are mapped between control and component
layer. To finally connect all the artifacts generated in the analy-
sis, hazard scenarios need to be described. A hazard scenario
is a textual representation of one specific case during system
operation in which a system flaw can lead to a hazardous
control action and subsequently to a system hazard with the
possibility of a system loss. Each scenario is linked to a set of
violated constraints that trigger system flaws and lead to a haz-
ardous control action being taken. The textual representation
is very important. During the analysis a lot of data are gen-
erated and processed by the team of analysts but it is not easy
to structure. This makes it very difficult for external person-
nel to understand and use the analysis results. A hierarchically
structured list of hazard scenarios provides a textual repre-
sentation of the final analysis results. Reading through the
scenarios, a person external to the analyst team can identify
the most relevant aspects and find the more detailed results
from there. Therefore, it is essential to correlate the sce-
narios with system flaws and violated control actions.
The list of hazard scenarios can be very long and should
be hierarchically structured. One generic scenario can be defined
for each safety or security flaw of the system. Each scenario
can then be refined iteratively into sub-scenarios. The set of
scenario refinements is represented as a tree. The scenarios
highlight the ways in which the system can fail. They provide
the structured summary of the analysis results and the start-
ing point for in-depth analysis. Further, they can be used to
evaluate mitigation strategies for effectiveness. A tree of sce-
narios is effectively mitigated if every path from a leaf node
to the root node is prevented. The system can be considered
safe and secure, if scenario tree is effectively mitigated.
For space reasons it is not possible to provide a full list of
all hazard scenarios at this point in the paper. However, one
example is discussed in detail.
Table 8 – CTRL-C-5 can cause out-of-sync reclosure (H-1). Mapping the relevant constrants to the component level, full
circles indicate that the constraints need to be ensured at a certain component. Half circles indicate that the constraints
can be affected by the component, but mitigation strategies at the specific component are not sufficient. This does not
mean that mitigation at this point should be ignored, but that the effectiveness needs to be considered with care.
CSTR SLAs Appl. layer CPT-N-8 CPT-N-7
I-5 ○ ● ◐ ◐
I-6 ● ○ ◐ ◐
I-7 ○ ● ◐ ◐
I-8 ● ○ ◐ ◐
A-1 ● ○ ◐ ◐
A-2 ● ○ ● ◐
A-3 ● ○ ● ◐
A-4 ● ○ ● ◐
Reliab. ● ○ ○ ●
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Scenario 1: The controller incorrectly believes that the voltage
difference is within the limits.
Hazards: H-1, H-3, H-5
System Flaw: F-1
Hazardous Control Action: HC-1
Control Level Components: CTRL-N-1, CTRL-N-4, CTRL-C-4,
CTRL-N-5, CTRL-C-5
Component Level Components: CPT-N-1, CPT-N-5, CPT-C-6,
CPT-N-7, CPT-N-8, CPT-N-9, CPT-C-7, CPT-C-9
Scenario 1 represents flaw F1 directly. Based on this sce-
nario, the detailed analysis of the safety and security constraints
will be used to create more detailed sub-scenarios.
Scenario 1.1: The speed controller (CPT-N-1) interprets the
correct feedback incorrectly.
Control Level Components: CTRL-N-1
Component Level Components: CPT-N-1
Safety Constraints: Reliability of device and algorithm, Cor-
rectness of algorithm
Security Constraints: CSTR-I-5, CSTR-I-7
Scenario 1.2: The feedback received at CTRL-N-1 from the
remote PMU (CTRL-N-5) is incorrect but consid-
ered valid.
Control Level Components: CTRL-N-1, CTRL-N-5, CTRL-C- 5
Component Level Components: CPT-N-1, CPT-N-9, CPT-N-7,
CPT-N-8, CPT-C-7, CPT-C-9
Safety Constraints: Reliability of CPT-N-9
Security Constraints: CSTR-I-5, CSTR-I-7
Scenario 1.2.1: CTRL-N-4 sends incorrect feedback.
Control Level Components: CTRL-N-5
Component Level Components: CPT-N-9
Safety Constraints: Reliability of CPT-N-9
Security Constraints: CSTR-I-5, CSTR-I-7, successful exploit
of CPT-N-9
Scenario 1.2.2: Correct feedback from CTRL-N-4 is altered or
additional feedback is injected at CTRL-C-5.The
communication is valid at CPT-C-1.
Control Level Components: CTRL-C-5
Component Level Components: CPT-C-7, CPT-N-7, CPT-N-8
Safety Constraints: none
Security Constraints: CSTR-I-5, CSTR-I-7
Scenario 1.2.3: Correct feedback from CTRL-N-4 is altered or
additional feedback is injected at CTRL-C-5.The
communication is invalid at CPT-C-1 but
accepted.
Control Level Components: CTRL-N-1, CTRL-C-5
Component Level Components: CPT-N-1, CPT-C-7, CPT-N-7,
CPT-N-8
Safety Constraints: none
Security Constraints: CSTR-I-5, CSTR-I-7
Scenario 1.3 is close to equivalent with Scenario 1.2. We would
only need to consider the local PMU and its communication
to the speed controller instead of the remote PMU. Similar con-
siderations result in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 based on Scenario
1. For the final three system flaws, the scenarios are de-
signed in the same manner. The hierarchical approach is used
to refine the scenarios and make the cases more concrete.
Further refinement is possible for Scenario 1.2.1 for example —
ultimately we can define a scenario for each way a con-
straint can be violated at a specific concrete component — but
a reasonable middle ground should be achieved.
6. Discussion
With our analysis we are able to describe the various ways a
system can fail. Each scenario described in Sect. 5.5 high-
lights the safety and security constraints that are violated in
order to cause a specific system hazard. The tree structure has
multiple benefits.
(i) The root scenario can be used to communicate the need
for mitigation strategies at board levels. They describe
the faulty or malicious system behavior at high level and
point out the potential system losses and thus the cost
in the worst case.
(ii) Mitigation strategies can be applied at each node of the
tree. All scenarios in a specific tree are effectively miti-
gated when every path from a child node to the root is
mitigated at least at one point.
(iii) Each child node can be further refined to explicitly high-
light a specific way to violate a constraint.That way attack
trees can be used to further refine hazard scenarios in
the cyber-security domain. If all paths through the attack
tree are secured, the scenario is mitigated.
(iv) With the increased visibility that the tree structure pro-
vides the requirements for in-depth security analysis are
highlighted. If a specific hazard scenario does not provide
enough detail to design an effective mitigation strat-
egy and no parent scenario can be mitigated, detailed
analysis is required.
As a system-based hazard analysis technique, STPA-
SafeSec does not directly provide quantifiable results. However,
known approaches to make system-based hazard analysis tech-
niques like HAZOP more quantifiable can also be applied to
STPA-SafeSec. Further, methods to quantify attack trees can
also be applied to the tree structure of STPA-SafeSec results.
The following examples show how the hazards caused by
Scenario 1 can be mitigated. One way would be the introduc-
tion of an additional safety device at the circuit breaker. This
device is hardwired to both sides of the circuit breaker and
locally measures voltage magnitude, frequency and phase angle.
If the difference over the circuit breaker in any of the metrics
is too high, the device prevents the circuit breaker from closing.
This strategy would mitigate H-1 (out-of-sync reclosure) and
subsequently also H-3 and H-5 in Scenario 1. Thus, all hazards
of the scenario would be mitigated and the child scenarios do
not need further consideration. This approach has the draw-
back that a set of devices might be compromised without the
operator’s notice, as the safety device shields the feedback.The
problem here is with attribution and state awareness. Addi-
tional monitoring capabilities need to be installed to achieve
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better state awareness of the ICT systems. However, STPA-
SafeSec focuses on the loss free operation of the system: Thus,
it does not identify the need for these systems necessarily if
this sort of state awareness is not required to mitigate a certain
hazard scenario.
A different approach would be to consider the sub-scenarios
in detail. Scenario 1.2.2 can be mitigated with the use of an
application layer protocol that ensures data integrity (either
with the use of cryptographic signatures or end-to-end en-
cryption). Scenario 1.2.3 requires that the data integrity checks
are actually validated at CPT-N-1. Mitigation of Scenario 1.2.1
is more difficult. The reliability constraint can be ensured over
device quality of CTRL-N-4, or redundancy. But to ensure the
integrity of the device, we need an in-depth security analysis
of the device. The same in-depth analysis is required for CPT-
N-1 to mitigate Scenario 1.1.
Based on the two examples, it seems obvious that the first
strategy is more effective. First, one additional device is most
probably more cost effective than the detailed security analy-
sis, the change in protocols and the mitigation strategies that
need to be applied as a result of the further analysis. But Sce-
nario 1 is only one hazard scenario in the system. An analysis
of scenarios based on system flaw F-5 (the speed controller in-
correctly believes that no set-point change is required) cannot
be mitigated in the same way. Incorrect feedback to the speed
controller will indefinitely prevent the reclosure of the circuit
breaker since no synchronization can be achieved. To miti-
gate these scenarios integrity checks at application level are
necessary as well as the in-depth analysis of CPT-N-1. Under
these considerations the more effective mitigation would be
to ensure the security constraints.
This shows how the results of STPA-SafeSec can be used
to weigh complex decisions about the most critical compo-
nents and the most effective mitigation strategies. Further,
STPA-SafeSec highlights scenarios where no physical mitiga-
tion strategy is valid.To limit the damage a priority can be given
to system losses in order to prevent the most critical losses
by accepting less critical losses. In our example it would be pos-
sible to accept L-4 (interruption of power supply to consumer
loads) to prevent L-1 (injury to humans).
The presented analysis does not present automated ways
to perform STPA-SafeSec. However, semi-automated methods
that were defined for traditional STPA can be directly applied
to some parts of STPA-SafeSec. Additionally, similar semi-
automated methods can be applied for the novel steps in
STPA-SafeSec.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed safety and security aspects of
a microgrid use case around synchronous-islanded opera-
tion.To control these operational states, an increased integration
of power systems with ICT communication is needed. This in-
tegration motivates new approaches to analyze systems with
respect to safety and security. We have presented such a novel
approach — STPA-SafeSec — that unifies and extends the
System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) technique for safety
analysis and STPA-sec for security analysis. The novel contri-
bution of this work is to formalize an approach to analyze the
dependencies between physical limitations imposed by real
power equipment and the capabilities of an attacker in the cyber
domain. This formalization allows analysts to use previous re-
search results in the security domain (e.g., Wang and Lu, 2013)
and apply them to an infrastructure. Further, known methods
to quantify results from system-based hazard analysis tech-
niques can be applied to STPA-SafeSec. We are able to show
that safety and security constraints need to be tackled to-
gether to identify the full set of scenarios that lead to system
losses. With the introduction of a component layer, we were
able to identify the physical impact that existing security vul-
nerabilities like GPS jamming (Hu and Wei, 2009) can have on
the system. The ability to highlight the physical effects of se-
curity vulnerabilities or system flaws based on high level system
losses make the results easier to communicate at board level
than generic security analysis result provided, for example, by
Dondossola et al. (2008). STPA-SafeSec is further able to guide
in-depth security analysis to the most critical components and
integrate the results. We showed an example where different
mitigation strategies from the safety and security domain miti-
gate a scenario that lead to high level system losses.
Furthermore, the results from STPA-SafeSec can be used to
design complex reactive frameworks that ensure system safety,
such as the one presented by Ten et al. (2010).
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